BUEC 311: Business Economics, Organization and Management Government Intervention

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- Market Failure and Government Policy
- Regulation of Imperfectly Competitive Markets
- Secondary Externalities
- Open-Access, Club, and Public Goods
- Intellectual Property

Government Intervention

- Now we will examine how/why governments intervene in the market.
- Two main motives for government response:
 - Market failures caused by non-competitive market structures.
 - Response may be regulation, <u>antitrust</u>, or competition policy.
 - Market failures caused by externalities.
 - A market failure that arises due to incomplete property rights.
- <u>Idea</u>: Government is trying to eliminate deadweight loss created by market failures.

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Market Failure and Government Policy

- <u>Recall</u>: Perfectly competitive markets achieve economic efficiency and maximize total surplus.
- However, in practice, most markets exhibit market failures.
 - Implication: potential substantial welfare losses.
- Deadweight loss created by market failures creates a rationale for government intervention:
 - Try to reduce/eliminate market failure.
- But is government intervention desirable?

Market Failure and Government Policy

- Economists use metrics to evaluate government policy:
 - Pareto principle: A policy is desirable if it yields a Pareto improvement.
 - A Pareto improvement is any reallocation of goods or productive inputs that helps at least one person, without harming anyone else.
 - Cost-Benefit principle: A policy is desirable if its benefits exceed the costs.
 - Any policy that increases total surplus is desirable even if some will be harmed.
- Three points to note:
 - Any policy that generates a Pareto improvement satisfies the cost-benefit principle, but the converse is not necessarily true.
 - 2 In practice, policies that have large net benefits and small distributional effects tend to have broad support. Policies with small net benefits and/or large distributional effects are likely to be contentious.
 - Economists also devote substantial analysis to distributional effects and, while there are metrics for these considerations, they tend to be less formally analysed




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Eliminating Market Failure Due to Imperfect Competition

- Three approaches governments can use to address the market failure created by imperfectly competitive pricing:
 - In the case of a monopoly: Own the monopolist and set relatively low prices.
 - Ex: Government ownership of electric power/water utilities.
 - Regulate firms to prevent them from setting excessively high prices.
 - Ohange market structure using antitrust or competition policy.

- Most common approach to correcting market failure arising from imperfect competition: price controls.
 - Ex: Price caps are used to regulate telecommunications monopolies in 33 U.S. states, and Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico and the U.K.
- <u>Idea</u>: Government can eliminate deadweight loss by imposing a price cap equal to the price that would prevail in a competitive market.



	Monopoly Without Regulation	Monopoly with Optimal Regulation	Change
Consumer Surplus, CS	A	A + B + C	$B + C = \Delta CS$
Producer Surplus, PS	B + D	D + E	$E - B = \Delta PS$
Total Surplus, $TS = CS + PS$	A + B + D	A+B+C+D+E	$C + E = \Delta TS$
Deadweight Loss, DWL	-C - E	0	$C + E = \Delta DWL$

 Would a government always be able to eliminate deadweight loss using a price cap?

- Regulation can be sub-optimal for several reasons:
 - Poor information about demand and/or costs.
 - Limited information may lead to a price cap set above or below the efficient level.
 - Inability to subsidize.
 - If a monopolist exhibits economies of scale, it may require a subsidy to produce the efficient level, which may not be politically viable.
 - Regulatory capture.
 - Many firms engage in <u>rent seeking</u> (they devote effort and expenditures to gain a "rent" or profit from government actions) to capture the regulator.
 - A captured regulator will put industry interests ahead of the public interest.



- Issues of information/subsidization/capture aside, it is important to recognize that regulating markets where p > MC may still not be socially desirable because enacting regulation is costly.
 - Costs include gathering information, mistakes, regulatory capture/rent seeking.
- Governments should only regulate when doing so passes a cost-benefit test.
 - Typically this will be when market failures are large; in this case, the benefits from reducing a market failure will most likely exceed the costs.


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- An externality occurs when a person's well being, or a firm's production capability is directly affected by the actions of other consumers or firms rather than indirectly through changes in prices.
 - Effect is external because it occurs *outside* of the market and, hence, has not price.
- Externalities can be negative or positive.
 - A negative externality harms others:
 - Ex. A chemical plant that dumps waste into a lake, reducing the profits of a firm that rents boats.
 - A positive externality helps others:
 - Ex. A homeowner that invests a lot in landscaping on his/her property increases the value of neighbours' homes too.



- When activities create externalities, the competitive market outcome will be inefficient.
- As an example, consider a competitive market in which firms produce paper.
 - Paper production creates pollution and greenhouse gas emissions as a byproduct.
 - Pollution harms people who live near paper mills, while greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change
- Assume, to start, that the paper mills do not have to pay for the harm that their pollution emissions cause.


- Because firms do not pay for the harm that their pollution causes, they only consider <u>direct costs</u> associated with production (labor, capital, energy, wood pulp, etc) when choosing how much to produce; the <u>indirect costs</u> created by the harm from the externality are ignored.
- The <u>social cost</u> associated with paper production is the sum of direct and indirect costs.
 - It is the total cost to society.
- If the firms do not pay for the harm that their pollution causes, the competitive market produces excessive pollution because *each firm's private*, direct cost is less than the social cost.



	Social Optimum	Private	Change
Consumer Surplus, CS	A	A + B + C + D	B + C + D
Private Producer Surplus, PSp	B+C+F+G	F + G + H	H-B-C
Externality Cost, Cx	C + G	C+D+E+G+H	D + E + H
Social Producer Surplus, $PSs = PSp - Cx$	B + F	F-C-D-E	-B-C-D-E
Total Surplus, $TS = CS + PS_s$	A + B + F	A + B + F - E	-E = DWL



- If the government has sufficient knowledge about the harm caused by pollution, the demand curve, costs, and production technologies, it can force a competitive market to produce the socially optimal level of output.
- The government can control pollution directly by:
 - setting <u>emission standards</u>, or by taxing pollution with an <u>emissions fee</u> or an effluent change
 - limiting outputs or inputs







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Open-Access, Club, And Public Goods

- The characteristics of goods and services can also create motives for government intervention.
- Goods and services differ in their <u>rivalry</u> and <u>excludability</u>.
 - Rivalry:
 - A good exhibits rivalry if its consumption by one individual means that no one else can consume it (ex: an orange).
 - A good is non-rival if its consumption by one individual means that anyone else can consume it (ex: clean air).
 - Excludability:
 - A good is excludable if the owner of a good can prevent others from consuming it.
 - A good is non-excludable if the owner of the good cannot prevent others from consuming it.

Open-Access, Club, And Public Goods

	Exclusion	No Exclusion
Rivalry	Private good: apple, pencil, computer, car	Open-access common property good: fishery, freeway
No Rivalry	Club good: cable television, concert, tennis club	Public good: national defense, clean air, lighthouse

Figure: Classification of Goods and Services

Open-Access

- Open-access common property is non-exclusive, but rival.
 - Typical of many natural resources.
 - Ex: An open-access fishery: Anyone can fish, but fish is rival.
 - Open access means that the resource is overexploited.
 - Ex: Each fisher wants to catch a given fish to gain property fights to that fish; they ignore the externality cost from reduced current and future fish populations. This leads to overfishing.
 - Similar problems arise with water, oil and natural gas, public freeways.
 - Government regulation can solve the overexploitation problem by restricting access to the commons.
 - Typical approaches: First-come, first-served; charging entry fee/tax.
 - Alternative approach: Assign property rights to create common property.

Club Goods

- Club goods are non-rival, but are subject to exclusion.
 - Common example: Golf or Country clubs.
 - Clubs exclude people who do not pay membership fees, but services provided (swimming or golfing), are non-rival until full capacity is reached.
 - Problem: The marginal cost for the club of accepting an additional member is close to zero, but clubs charge more than that. This is a market failure, creates a deadweight loss.
 - Another example: Cable TV/Streaming Services
 - Need to pay to access (exclusion), but one individual?s use does not affect another (non-rival).
 - Market failure from price above marginal cost.
- Government intervention to reduce deadweight loss from club goods is rare.
 - A firm may shut down if it is forced to sell at low (zero) marginal cost, creating larger deadweight loss.



- Public Goods are non-rival and nonexclusive.
 - Ex: Clean air, security, national defence.
 - If a firm reduces its pollution (cleans the air), it provides a non-priced benefit to its neighbours; a positive externality.
 - Public goods are typically undersupplied because of property rights are not clearly defined.
 - Issue: Because good is non-exclusive, individuals can benefit from the actions of others without paying.
 - People benefit from cleaning efforts of a firm without paying, so it is difficult for a firm to profitably provide clean air.
 - Consequence: Public goods are under-supplied by markets.
 - Governments can eliminate the free rider problem by providing goods directly.
 - Other solutions require governmental or collective actions such as social

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Intellectual Property

- Intellectual property: property rights over knowledge.
 - Issue: knowledge is a public good. It is non-rival and non-exclusive.
 - Creates a free rider problem; firms can benefit from discoveries of rivals without paying the research cost.
 - Such free riding limits the incentive to innovate.
- Typical approach to correct free rider problem: patents and copyrights.
- But intellectual property rights create an alternative problem: monopoly power.
 - To avoid this governments may fund research with the goal of making findings public or open source.
 - Another alternative: using innovation prizes.

Takeaways

- Governments may intervene in markets to correct market failures arising from non-competitive market structures or externalities.
 - Characteristics of goods can also create a motive for government involvement in market.
- Optimal intervention requires lots of information about the market.
- Intervention should only occur if the benefits exceed the costs.